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LABOR LAW-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-SECTION
8(B)(1)(A)-UNION RESTRICTION ON RESIGNATION AND POST-RESIG-
NATION CONDUCT-The National Labor Relations Board has held
that any union restriction on a member's right to resign or other-
wise refrain from engaging in Section 7 activities is invalid.
International Association v. Machinists, Local 1414, 270 N.L.R.B.
1330 (1984)
On September 8, 1980, employees in a bargaining unit repre-
sented by International Association of Machinists and Aeros-
paceworkers, Local 1414 (hereinafter the Union), commenced an
economic strike against Neufeld Porsche-Audi, Inc., their em-
ployer.1 The strike ended approximately six-months later, on
March 1, 1981.2 Before the strike ended, on January 23, 1981,
Branislav Locki, a member of the Union and of the striking bar-
gaining unit, delivered a letter of resignation to the Union and re-
turned to work.3 Thereafter, the Union filed internal charges and
imposed a $2,500 court-collectable fine against Locki 4 for returning
to work during the strike in violation of the Union's constitution.5
In response to the Union's actions against Locki, employer
Neufeld Porsche-Audi, Inc. filed a charge with the National Labor
Relations Board (hereinafter the Board) alleging that the Union
had engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of the
1. International Ass'n of Machinists, Local 1414, 270 N.L.R.B. 1330, 1331 (1984). The
parties submitted, and the Board approved, a proposed record consisting, in part, of the
parties' stipulation of facts. Id.
2. Id. at 1331.
3. Id. at 1330-31.
4. Id. at 1331.
5. Id. Article L, Section 3 of the International's constitution provides in pertinent
part:
Improper Conduct of a Member ... accepting employment in any capacity in an
establishment where a strike or lockout exists as recognized under this Constitution,
without permission. Resignation shall not relieve a member of his obligation to re-
frain from accepting employment at the establishment for the duration of the strike
or lockout if the resignation occurs during the period of the strike or lockout or
within 14 days preceding its commencement. Where observance of a primary picket
line is required, any resignation tendered during the period that the picket line is
maintained, or within 14 days preceding its establishment, shall not become effective
as a resignation during the period the picket line is maintained, nor shall it relieve a




National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter the NLRA or Act)6 by
its imposition of a fine against Locki.7 Thereafter, the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint
against the Union alleging that it had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) s
of the Act. On November 16, 1981, upon the Union's answer to the
complaint, denying that it had violated the Act, the parties jointly
moved the Board to transfer the proceedings to the Board, without
benefit of a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.9 The mo-
tion to transfer was granted.10
The issue before the Board was whether the Union violated sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act when it imposed a fine upon an em-
ployee who had resigned from the Union and returned to work
during a strike. The employer and General Counsel relied upon the
decision in Dalmo Victor I, in which the Board held that a similar
provision in a union's constitution violated section 8(b)(1)(A), be-
cause it was regarded as a restriction upon post-resignation con-
duct. Generally, the union relied on the Ninth Circuit's denial of
enforcement of Dalmo Victor I and argued that the provision in
the Union's constitution was a restriction on resignation rather
than a restriction on post-resignation conduct."
The Board 2 held that the Union's 1981 restrictions on resigna-
tion, as well as any restrictions a union may impose on resignation,
are invalid, and that the Union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act by imposing a fine against Locki.'s In so doing, the Board ex-
pressly overruled its decision in Dalmo Victor II and its prog-
6. National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
7. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1330.
8. National Labor Relations Act, as amended, section 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158
(b)(1)(A) (1976). The pertinent provisions of section 8(b)(1)(A) are as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . (1) to
restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7:
PROVIDED, that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to
prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein ....
Id.
9. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1330.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1331. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
12. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1331. The Board majority consisted of Chairman Dotson, and
Members Hunter and Dennis. Id. at 1337. Member Zimmerman dissented in part. Id.
13. Id. at 1331.
14. International Ass'n of Machinists, Local 1327, 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982), enf. de-
nied, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1984) (hereinafter cited as Dalmo Victor II). In International
Ass'n of Machinists, Local 1327, 231 N.L.R.B. 719 (1977), enf. denied and remanded, 608
F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979) (hereinafter cited as Dalmo Victor I), the Board found invalid a
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eny. 1' The majority adopted the approach advocated by the con-
curring opinion in Dalmo Victor 1116 in which Chairman Van de
Water and Member Hunter had argued that any restriction on a
union member's right to resign or otherwise refrain from engaging
in section 7 activities,1 7 would be invalid."8
Tracking the concurring analysis in Dalmo Victor II, the major-
ity relied on applicable principles espoused by the Supreme
Court in four cases: NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers;"9 Scofield v.
union's constitution that provided that resignations during strikes or picketing or within 14
days prior to commencement of such activities would not relieve members of their obligation
to refrain from accepting employment at the struck establishment. The rule provided for
the fining of so-called strikebreakers as a means of enforcement. In concluding that the rule
violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, the Board determined that the rule was designed as a
restriction not on resignations, but on post-resignation conduct. 231 N.L.R.B. at 720-21.
On petition for review and cross-application for enforcement of the Board's order in
Dalmo Victor I, the Ninth Circuit rejected as "hypertechnical" the Board's conclusion that
the union's rule was a restriction on post-resignation conduct and remanded the case to the
Board to decide the extent to which contractual restrictions on members' rights to resign are
consistent with the policies of the Act. 608 F.2d at 1222.
On remand, the Board majority concluded that by limiting the right to resign to non-
strike periods, the union's rule constituted an "unreasonable restriction" and was, therefore,
invalid, 263 N.L.R.B. at 985. However, the Dalmo Victor II majority indicated that it would
uphold a union rule prohibiting a resignation. Id. at 987. In their concurring opinion, [for-
mer] Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter concluded that any restriction on a
member's right to resign from a union would be violative of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
On petition for review and cross-application for enforcement of the Board's order, the Ninth
Circuit denied enforcement.
In concluding that, in Dalmo Victor II, deferral to the Board's expertise in construing and
applying the labor laws was not warranted, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Board's
holding, including the thirty day rule articulated by the concurring opinion therein, would
frustrate federal labor policies. 725 F.2d at 1215. Further, the Ninth Circuit determined that
the union's rule passed muster under the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Scofield
v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969), 725 F.2d at 1216-17. See also infra note 27 and accompany-
ing text.
15. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1331.
16. 263 N.L.R.B. at 987 (Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter concurring).
See supra note 14.
17. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)). Section 157 of 29 U.S.C. provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor orga-
nizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or mu-
tual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement re-
quiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as author-
ized in section 8(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157.
18. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1331.
19. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). In this case, a union fined
full union members who had crossed a picket line and returned to work during an author-
ized strike in violation of the union's constitution and bylaws. Id. at 176-77. After a thor-
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NLRB;20 NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029;21 and Machinists
Booster Lodge 405 v. NLRB.22 All four cases analyzed the extent of
a union's authority to enforce its rules against member and non-
member employees, without running afoul of section 8(b)(1)(A)
and related provisions of the Act.
In Allis-Chalmers, the Supreme Court held that a union may
sanction its full members if they violate union rules by returning
to work during a strike.2 From this case, the Board examined the
Court's definition of union actions that are "internal"2" in nature
and those that are "external" 25 in nature and noted that the Court,
through its analysis of the Act and its legislative history, intended
to insulate only "internal" union actions from the proscriptions of
section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Thus, where a union takes action
which interferes with an employee's employment status or at-
ough review of legislative history and federal labor practices, the Court determined that the
imposition of fines pursuant to the rule was not violative of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Id.
at 197. The Court noted a distinction between individuals who enjoy "full membership" and
those whose affiliation with the union is limited to a mere tender of periodic dues and initia-
tion fees in compliance with a union security provision in a contract, but the Court stated
that it expressed no opinion as to whether fines could be imposed on such limited members.
Id.
20. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969). In Scofield, the Supreme Court upheld a
union's imposition of fines on members who had violated a union rule that provided for a
production ceiling on piecework. Id. at 424-27.
21. NLRB v. Textile Workers Union of America, Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972)
(hereinafter cited as Granite State). The Supreme Court held unlawful the imposition of
fines on individuals who had returned to work during a strike after they had resigned from
the union. While noting that neither the contract nor the union's constitution or bylaws
contained a provision restricting a member's right to resign, the Court expressed that its
decision in this case would not decide whether the right to resign could be curtailed by the
contractual relationship between a member and his union. Id. at 217.
22. International Ass'n of Machinists, Local 405, v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973) (herein-
after cited as Booster Lodge). The Court* rejected the union's contention that fines levied
against members who had resigned were lawful, as a matter of contract law, inasmuch as the
union's constitution had in the past been consistently interpreted to bind employees to a
strike despite their resignations. Id. at 89. The union made this argument because its consti-
tution contained no express language providing for any such obligations on resignees. Id.
Although it acknowledged that none of these cases expressly addressed a union's authority
to restrict members' resignations, the Board determined that these cases provided an "ana-
lytical framework ' from which to decide the issue of resignation restrictions. 270 N.L.R.B.
at 1331-32.
23. 388 U.S. at 175, 178-95.
24. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1332 (citing Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 195). The Board inter-
preted the Court's definition of "internal" union actions as "those taken against full union
members pursuant to a nonarbitrary rule aimed at achieving a legitimate union objective."
270 N.L.R.B. at 1332.
25. Id. The Board defined "external" union actions as those that are "aimed at inter-
fering with an employee's employment status" or those actions that "are taken against non-
members or employees outside the bargaining unit." Id.
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tempts to discipline non-members, the union is in violation of sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A). 8
The second component of the Board's "analytical framework"
was supplied by Scofield in the form of a test (hereinafter the
"Scofield test") set forth by the Court for evaluating the lawful-
ness of a union rule. A union rule passes the "Scofield test" if it
"reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy that Con-
gress has embedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced
against union members who are free to leave the union and escape
the rule.
27
Third, the Board emphasized the Court's application of the
Scofield test in Granite State, where, during a strike, employees
had resigned their memberships before returning to work in viola-
tion of a union rule.28 Essentially, the Board noted that while the
Granite State Court determined that a union had a legitimate in-
terest in prohibiting members who had already resigned from re-
turning to work during a strike, the rule failed the Scofield test
because it impaired employees' section 7 rights to refrain from en-
gaging in union or other concerted activities and because it im-
paired members' rights to "leave the union and escape the rule."29
The Board completed its "analytical framework" by examining
principles espoused by the Court in Booster Lodge. ° In that case,
the Court rejected the union's contention that fines levied against
members who had resigned were lawful inasmuch as the union's
constitution had, in the past, been consistently interpreted to bind
employees to a strike despite their resignation."1
In applying the Scofield test to the instant case, the Board rec-
ognized that a union rule restricting resignation clearly reflected
legitimate union interests and thus satisfied the first prong of the
test.32 However,- the Board also determined that the rule was in-
consistent with the policies Congress had embedded in the Act, in
that it impaired employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights
26. Id.
27. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
29. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1332. The Board noted further the Court's rejection in Granite
State of the union's argument that its rule was justified, in spite of Scofield, because of the
union's strong interests in strike solidarity. Id. at 1332-33.
30. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
31. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1333.
32. Id. The Board said that "a union rule restricting resignations plainly advances
legitimate union interests of maintaining strike solidarity and protecting the interests of
employees who desire to continue a strike." Id.
1986 963
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to "refrain from any or all" protected union or other activities."3
Further, in examining the nature of the Union's action in promul-
gating such a rule in light of the Allis-Chalmers Court's distinction
between internal and external activities, the Board concluded that
the union had overstepped its authority by expanding the defini-
tion of internal action in a manner that could enable it to regulate
conduct over which it would otherwise have no control.
34
Next, the Board rejected the Union's contention that its rule was
justified because it sought to preserve strike solidarity and protect
the right of employees who choose to strike. The Board noted that
the Court had rejected a similar argument in Granite State where
employees had unanimously voted for imposition of sanctions on
anyone who sought to return to work during a strike, 5 and in
Booster Lodge where the union's constitution had been consist-
ently interpreted to bind employees to strikes despite their resig-
nation."6 From these cases, the Board drew an inference that the
Court would likewise reject the Union's argument that an express
constitutional provision would still bind its members.3 7
33. Id. In so concluding, the Board stressed that even under the provisions in section
8(b)(2) of the Act and the second proviso to section 8(a)(3) of the Act, no employee can be
compelled to become a "full" union member, and that, under these sections, employees still
remain free to refrain from union or other protected concerted activities. Id.
Section 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2)
(1976), provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . (2) to
cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in viola-
tion of subsection (a)(3) or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom
membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground
other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
Id. Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(1), (3) (1976), including the second proviso to section 8(a)(3), provide in pertinent
part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an Employer ...
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in section 7 ...
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organiza-
tion . . . . Provided further, that no employer shall justify any discrimination against
an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the
same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members ....
Id.
34. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1333 n.16.
35. Id. at 1334.
36. Id.
37. Id. The Board, relying on the concurring opinion in Dalmo Victor 11, 263 N.L.R.B.
at 990-91 (Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter, concurring), expressed that any
964
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In support of its decision, the Board noted that recently Pattern
Makers League of North America v. NLRB3 8 enforced the Board's
order and held that a union's rule restricting resignations was un-
reasonable and, therefore, invalid. In Pattern Makers, the Seventh
Circuit embraced the reasoning of the concurring opinion in Dalmo
Victor II, which the Board has now adopted as representative of
the Board majority."9 However, since the instant case arose within
the Ninth Circuit, which recently denied enforcement of Dalmo
Victor H1,40 the Board set forth its reasons for its disagreement
with the Ninth Circuit rationale. In its decision to deny enforce-
ment of Dalmo Victor II, the Ninth Circuit relied on a "mutual
subscription" theory, which, the Board notes, was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Granite State.4' Under this theory, members
who seek to escape their obligations to their fellow members by
resigning from the union and returning to work should not be able
to do so without retribution.42
Significantly, the Board majority agreed with the Ninth Circuit's
general theory that the wishes of individual members are sub-
servient to the majority will, represented by the union in such a
way that an employee's absolute power to order his relationship
with management is restricted. However, the Board disagreed with
the Ninth Circuit's particular invocation of that principle where a
member's or non-member's section 7 rights are impaired to justify
restrictions on the authority of employees to order their relation-
ships with unions. 43 Moreover, the majority rejected the Ninth Cir-
cuit's view that the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) 44 authorizes un-
effort to equate the institutional interests of a union with the statutory rights of employees
is inappropriate, and that a union's institutional interests could not overcome an employee's
section 7 rights. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1334. The Board further reasoned that to permit unions to
restrict resignations would compromise the neutrality of the Act by affording more protec-
tion to those who choose to engage in protected activities than to those who choose to re-
frain from such activities. Id. Finally, in applying the third prong of the Scofield test, the
Board concluded that restrictions on resignations are invalid since employees must be "free
to leave the union and escape the rule." Id.
38. Pattern Makers League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983), enforcing,
265 N.L.R.B. 1332 (1983). On a petition for review and a cross-petition for enforcement, the
Seventh Circuit granted enforcement of the Board's order, and affirmed the Board's finding
that the union had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by fining members who had re-
signed their membership and had returned to work during a strike. Id.
39. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1334-35 n.18. See also id. at 1335.
40. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
41. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1335.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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ions to impose at least temporary restrictions on members' rights
to resign and to return to work during a strike. 5 In the Board's
opinion, the Ninth Circuit overlooked the clear distinctions drawn
by the Allis-Chalmers Court between "internal" and "external"
union action,' 6 because it interpreted the proviso as authorizing
unions to take action against an employee who has resigned from
the union.47 Also criticized was the Ninth Circuit's view that the
guarantees of the 8(b)(1)(A) proviso and employees' section 7
rights to refrain from engaging in concerted activities "must-and
do- coexist". 8 Such "coexistence", the majority observed, would
result in a negation of expressed statutory rights in favor of a
union's institutional interest.'9
Finally, the Board pointed out that the Ninth Circuit overlooked
the third prong of the Scofield test requiring that members should
be "free to leave the union and escape the rule." 50 The Board
adopted the rationale of the Seventh Circuit emphasizing that at-
tention to this component of the Scofield test is essential to the
maintenance of a balance between employee rights and the collec-
tive power of their union.1
Board Member Zimmerman, dissenting in part, agreed with the
majority that the union's rule was invalid, but only because it
lacked sufficient temporal limitations and was thus, in his view,
unreasonable.52 In so holding, Zimmerman expressly adhered to
the position taken by the majority in Dalmo Victor II.51 Zimmer-
man labeled as erroneous the majority's conclusion that any re-
striction on resignations is invalid, since that conclusion was based
on a presupposition that the right to refrain from union or other
protected activity is an absolute right upon which no intrusions
could be permitted.5 In support of his position that such rights are
not absolute, Zimmerman noted that in Allis-Chalmers and
Scofield, the Supreme Court upheld some union rules that re-
stricted union members in the exercise of section 7 rights.5
5
45. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1335.
46. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
47. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1335.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1336.
50. Id. (citing 724 F.2d at 61).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1337.
53. Id. at 1340 n.6.
54. Id. at 1337.
55. Id. at 1338.
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While the Scofield Court held that for a union rule to be valid,
union members must be free to leave the union and escape the
rule," Zimmerman interpreted Scofield as implying that at least
limited and reasonable restrictions on resignations would be
valid. 5 7 As to the majority's reliance on Granite State in support of
its position that the right to refrain from union activity is absolute,
Zimmerman emphasized that the Court in that case limited its de-
cision to situations where no restrictions on resignations existed in
the union's constitution and bylaws." Zimmerman inferred, more-
over, that by prefacing its holding with this caveat, the Supreme
Court was suggesting that one's freedom to resign could be cur-
tailed by the contractual relationship between a union and its
members." In support of this criticism, Zimmerman noted that the
Supreme Court in Booster Lodge, though finding the union rule
unlawful, nonetheless took notice of the absence in the facts of any
expressed restrictions on resignations."
Continuing his dissent, Zimmerman challenged the majority's in-
terpretation of Supreme Court precedent as providing for bright
line distinctions between "internal" and "external" actions and
proposed that such distinctions are not as clear as the majority as-
serted.61 Zimmerman argued that in any event, merely because
some "external" effects would result from a rule that is designed to
be "internal" in nature, the rule would violate section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act only if it also impaired some federal labor policy.62 In this
regard, Zimmerman balanced a union's interest in its economic
strength vis-a-vis the employee's stronger interest in statutory
rights and concluded that at least a limited intrusion on the sec-
tion 7 rights to refrain from union or other protected activities is
warranted.63 Accordingly, Zimmerman supported adoption of the
Dalmo Victor H majority's reasonableness test that requires suffi-
cient notice, specificity and temporal limitations prior to restraints
on that intrusion."
56. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
57. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1338. Member Zimmerman observed that, under Scofield and Al-
lis-Chalmers, a "reasonable restriction, such as that stated in Dalmo Victor II," would be
permissible under the Act. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1338-39.
60. Id. at 1339.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1339-40.




An understanding of the historical circumstances under which
relevant provisions of the Act were enacted is key to compre-
hending the mind set of the Board when it decided International
Association v. Machinists Local 1414 (hereinafter Porsche-Audi).
In 1947, Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act
(hereinafter the Taft-Hartley Act)6" which amended but did not
displace the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) of 1935.6
Under the auspices of the Wagner Act, between 1935 and 1947,
organized labor experienced significant increases in prosperity and
bargaining strength. Unfortunately, during this period, some labor
leaders resorted to practices of dubious social value and thus in-
vited public criticism. In 1946, amid a myriad of social and eco-
nomic problems growing out of World War II, including a sharp
increase in the length and intensity of work stoppages, 7 Congress
and the public were convinced that new labor legislation would al-
leviate many of the shortcomings of the Wagner Act in checking
perceived abuses by organized labor. Congress' attitude toward or-
ganized labor during this period is reflected in various provisions of
the Taft-Hartley Act which placed narrowing restrictions on cer-
tain union security arrangements, provided for union unfair labor
practices and ensured greater freedom of choice for employees to
determine representation status free from union as well as em-
ployer interference.6 8 The most significant aspect of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act, at least for this discussion, were Congress' efforts to en-
hance the rights of employees as individuals. Such efforts are most
clearly evident in Congress' amendment of section 7 to include em-
ployees' rights to refrain from engaging in collective activities.6 9
Against this backdrop, it is understandable that, at least as far as
the Board was concerned, the debate over the resignation issue
culminated with the Board's decision in Porsche-Audi that any re-
striction on resignation is invalid.
Prior to its decision in Porsche-Audi, the Board's vacillation on
the issue of whether unions may restrict members in their right to
65. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61
Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97.
66. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68.
67. B. TAYLOR & F. WrrNY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 211 (1979). In 1946, this nation
experienced 4,985 strikes with an estimated working time lost amounting to 1.43 percent.
The prior year, the nation had experienced 4,750 strikes, but the estimated loss to working
time was only 0.47 percent. Id.
68. Id. at 213.
69. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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resign together with the split of opinion between the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits caused anxiety and uncertainty among both labor
and management and undoubtedly resulted in instability in the
fragile relationships between unions, employers and union mem-
bers. With the Porsche-Audi decision and its progeny,70 it began to
appear that the Board had finally adopted a definitive and clear
rule with respect to restrictions on resignations. This new-found
consistency was recently threatened, but then enhanced, as the Su-
preme Court squarely addressed the resignation issue in Pattern
Makers League v. NLRB.71
In Pattern Makers, by a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld
the Porsche-Audi Board's ruling that a union's rule that restricted
resignations was invalid.72 However, it did so on the basis of now
traditional administrative law principles, and in light of these prin-
ciples, the Court narrowed the issue to whether the Board's con-
struction of section 8(b)(1)(A) was "reasonable. 7 3 The Supreme
Court explained that because the Board has "special competence"
in the field of labor relations, its interpretation of the Act should
be accorded substantial deference .7  In determining that the
Board's construction was reasonable and that deference was war-
ranted, the Court reviewed prior Board decisions and noted partic-
ularly the Board's consistent construction of section 8(b)(1)(A) as
prohibiting the imposition of fines on employees who had tendered
resignations that were invalid under union constitutions. 7 The
Court also noted that in past cases involving similar issues, includ-
ing Allis-Chalmers, Scofield, Granite State and Booster Lodge, the
Supreme Court had "invariably yielded" to the Board's decisions r.7
Finally, the Court reviewed its own prior decisions, as well as perti-
nent legislative history, and determined that the Board's conclu-
sions were not inconsistent with any principles expressed therein.7
In short, the effect of the Court's decision in Pattern Makers has
70. In Sheet Metal Workers, 274 N.L.R.B. No. 54, slip op. at 5 (1985), the Board made
it clear that its holding in Porsche-Audi was not limited to restrictions on resignations dur-
ing strikes or lockouts and that any restrictions on resignations were invalid. Id.
71. 119 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 2928 (1985). See also supra note 38 and accompanying
text.
72. 119 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 2929.
73. Id. at 2933.
74. Id. at 2931. The Court stated that where the Board's construction of the Act is
"reasonable," it should not be rejected "merely because the Courts might prefer another
view of the statute." Id. at 2936 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979)).
75. 119 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 2932, 2937 n.28.
76. Id. at 2937 n.27.
77. Id. at 2930-36.
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been that the Porsche-Audi Board decision, that no restrictions on
resignations are valid, has become the controlling law in the area.
The web of litigation that led to the Supreme Court's review of
Pattern Makers spawned many divergent theories on the correct
construction of section 8(b)(1)(A). Three distinct positions were
discussed above and can be generally summarized as follows. First,
the Dalmo Victor H Board majority and the Porsche-Audi Board
dissent would uphold union rules that restrict resignations for not
more than thirty days. Second, the Dalmo Victor H Board concur-
rence, the Porsche-Audi majority and the Seventh Circuit agreed
that any restrictions on resignations would be unlawful. Third, the
Ninth Circuit would uphold a rule restricting resignations for at
least two weeks before a strike and then for the duration of the
strike. An analysis of the holdings in these cases and the clues con-
tained therein as to the Supreme Court's logical direction reveals
that the Court was signalling that ultimately, it would reject the
extreme construction of section 8(b)(1)(A) that restrictions on res-
ignations for the duration of a strike, or that any restrictions are
invalid. Upon weighing employees' interests in statutory rights to
engage in or refrain from section 7 activities, a union's interests in
self-preservation and members' interests in mutual reliance, the
Court should have acted consistently with its own precedent and
adopted what would resemble, for the most part, the Dalmo Victor
H thirty-day rule. In this way, the Court could have best facili-
tated the certainly legitimate, but not always equal, concerns of
employees, management and unions. Under this view, the Court
could have continued to give top priority to the right to refrain
from section 7 activities and could still have avoided the needless
sacrifice of legitimate concerns of unions and union members.
In Allis-Chalmers, the Court legitimized the imposition of fines
on "full members" who had crossed the union picket line in viola-
tion of the union's constitution and bylaws2 8 Although the Court
did not address the issue of whether unions may impair members
in their efforts to resign and avoid union discipline, the Court at
least signalled that the right to refrain from section 7 activities is
not an absolute one. In determining that restrictions on the con-
duct of "full members" are permissible, the Court noted that na-
tional labor policy has long been predicated on extinguishing an
individual's right to order his own relation with his employer in
78. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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favor of greater economic strength through collective activity. 79 As
to the Court's proper role in the enforcement of union rules affect-
ing "internal" union affairs, the Court observed that, historically,
the judiciary has recognized the existence of a contractual relation-
ship between unions and their members, and that its role has been
"but to enforce the contract." 0
In Scofield, the Supreme Court gave its approval to a union rule
that imposed restrictions on full members in their performance of
piecework for which the union had set certain production ceil-
ings.81 Although the Scofield Court was again confronted with a
union rule that in some way restricted rights of full members, the
Court articulated clear parameters within which it might analyze
union rules. Of particular importance in the Court's analysis were
the Court's stipulations that the rule has been "properly adopted"
and that it has been "reasonably adopted against union members
who are free to leave the union and escape the rule."8 " The re-
quirement that the rule have been "properly adopted" signalled
that the Court might not tolerate rules that were enacted with dis-
regard of the union's own guidelines, or in such a way that mem-
bers did not receive adequate notice of a rule in time to ponder the
ramifications of non-adherence. That members "must be free to
leave the union and escape the rule," suggests merely that the
union members must not be held as captives to union laws with
which they disagree. However, it does not follow, necessarily, that
the Court meant to say that members still must be free to leave
the union at any time. To so conclude would be to ignore the
Court's past expressed considerations of the importance of the ob-
ligations that are inherent in the contractual relationship between
members and unions, as well as a union's ability, as the exclusive
bargaining representative, to order the relationship between em-
ployer and employee.88 To allow union members to resign at any
time would allow these members to enjoy the best of both worlds
at their unfettered convenience. Moreover, the expense for this
79. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 180. The Court stated that "Congress has seen fit to
clothe the bargaining representative with "powers comparable to those possessed by a legisla-
tive body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents." Id. The Court
continued and held that these powers are especially vital in regulating members' conduct
during strikes, which the Court viewed as a union's ultimate weapon against an employer.
Id. at 181-82.
80. Id. at 182.
81. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
82. Id.
83. 388 U.S. at 180.
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luxury would not be borne in the least by the resigning member.
Rather, those who choose to support the collective effort would pay
most dearly for this right by way of mass defections when some
economic action, such as a strike, is imminent or in progress and
by either the lengthening of the conflict or the premature aban-
donment of the action. In addition, the resulting inability on the
part of the union to assess its own bargaining power at critical
points in negotiations would create a windfall for employers who
would likely advertise the attractiveness of defection in an effort to
undermine any collective action.
In Granite State, the Court found unlawful the imposition of
fines on those who had already resigned from the union.4 In es-
sence, the Court concluded that it was the union's attempt to exert
control over affairs that are "external" in nature that militated the
Court against the union's conduct.8 5 Thus, the Court reaffirmed its
long-standing view toward rules that affect the internal affairs of
unions and those that affect external affairs. However, inasmuch as
the resignation issue has implications for both internal and exter-
nal affairs, it is no wonder that the Porsche-Audi Board and the
Seventh Circuit struggled in their review using the traditional in-
ternal/external analysis. While such analysis was indeed helpful to
the Court in setting the parameters within which it would or would
not tolerate union rules, it loses its utility when applied to conduct
affecting the transition between these parameters.
In dicta, the Court in Granite State left open the extent to
which the contractual relationship between union and member
may curtail the freedom to resign. 6 In so doing, the Court ex-
pressly noted the absence in the facts of any restrictions in the
union's constitution or bylaws concerning the right to resign. That
the Court expended any effort at all in drawing this distinction
hinted that the Court did not plan to eliminate the considerations
of the importance of contractual relationships in later review."
Finally, it is important to note that the Booster Lodge Court re-
jected the union's argument that, as a matter of contract law, it
could fine members who had resigned and crossed the union's
picket line even though neither the union constitution nor its by-
84. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
85. Granite State, 409 U.S. at 215-16. The Court explained, "when there is a lawful
dissolution of a union-member relation, the union has no more control over the former
member than it has on the man in the street." Id. at 217.
86. Id. at 217.
87. Id. at 216.
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laws contained such restrictions. 8 Rather than address the ques-
tion of the extent to which contractual restrictions on member's
rights to resign may be limited by the Act, the Court majority
chose to strike down the union's rule on the basis that the mem-
bers lacked effective notice of the union's rule. 9 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Blackmun reinforced the importance of notice
considerations.9 Nevertheless, he added that the existence of ef-
fective notice of union rules, in and of itself, would not be enough
to give rise to a waiver of statutory rights.91 Before finding such a
waiver, Justice Blackmun would have looked further to what he
believed to be "more reliable indicia" of a member's intent. Specif-
ically, Justice Blackmun would have looked to whether members
had voted to strike, had ratified the strike breaking penalties and
had participated in the strike.9a
While Justice Blackmun's view is consistent with that expressed
by the Dalmo Victor II Board majority in that he would allow the
union to impose restrictions on resignations under certain condi-
tions, his test differs from the Board's test in that it places less
emphasis on the technical provision of the rule while focusing
keenly on the actual expectations of the members. Simply stated,
Justice Blackmun emphasized not only the existence of the rule
plus the effective notice by members of its existence; he would ad-
ditionally require affirmative acts by members who manifest their
consent to be bound by the rule as well.93
From the decision of the Booster Lodge majority and Justice
Blackmun's concurrence, it followed that the test that the Court
would ultimately adopt would include considerations of members'
effective notice of the the existence of the union's rule. However,
adoption by the Court of Justice Blackmun's test of members' con-
sent to the rule was unlikely since the union would have to wait
until the strike was imminent or in progress before it could seek
enforcement. Unfortunately, usually by the time a strike is immi-
nent or in progress, the damage to the union's interest has already
occurred. Contrasting a union's strong interest in avoiding strikes
for which it has no support and the need for the proper environ-
ment in which to make crucial decisions affecting the welfare of all
88. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
89. Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 88-89.
90. Id. at 91.
91. Id.




in the bargaining unit, with the relatively weak interest by mem-
bers to resign at the latest possible moment, the Court should have
utilized its review of the Pattern Makers case to carve out a finite
time period, for example, thirty days, during which a union could
restrict its members' right to resign.
With the Supreme Court's decision in Pattern Makers, it is clear
that the issue of whether unions may restrict members' rights to
resign is settled. That is, as the Board held in Porsche-Audi, any
restriction on a member's right to resign is invalid."" Though this
resolution is not necessarily inconsistent with any particular prior
holding of the Court, the reliance on traditional principles of re-
view of administrative action to reach this conclusion was charac-
teristic of what Justice Blackmun called the Court's "supine defer-
ence" to the Board.05 In this instance, the cost of the Court's
deference to the Board was considerable because it required that
the Court discard the wisdom of its carefully planned scheme
which had been nearly twenty years in the making.
John Cerilli
94. 270 N.L.R.B. at 1331.
95. Pattern Makers League, 119 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 2938.
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